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This article sheds light on the impacts and dynamics of the latest decentralization phase in 
Ethiopia, which seeks to professionalize and democratize local government. Based on recent 
field research in Oromiya Region, we draw attention to the paradoxes inherent in the top-
down decentralization of public administration within an authoritarian one-party state. On the 
one hand, decentralization in Oromiya has empowered kebele administrations and facilitated 
the expansion of service delivery into rural hinterlands. In particular the sub-kebele state and 
party structure is instrumentalized by local governments to mobilize and control households. 
On the other hand, state authority remains limited as peasants resist and subvert state-led 
development works and kebele officials must rely on clientelistic networks to implement 
policies. Consequently, decentralization and kebele reform in post-1991 Ethiopia have so far 
neither altered the tradition of hierarchical state-society relations nor improved the lack of 
genuine representative democracy at kebele level. 
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Introduction 
In an attempt to break with the centralist and authoritarian legacy of the Ethiopian state, 
the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has overseen an 
ambitious decentralization agenda since assuming power 1991. While a four-tiered 
institutional set-up consisting of regional states, zones, districts, and kebele (sub-districts) 
was broadly maintained, Ethiopian state institutions were restructured in successive and 
partly overlapping phases of decentralization in the past two decades.1 A first round of 
federal restructuring took place under the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991-
1994) and ended with the adoption of the new federal constitution (December 1994), 
instituting nine predominantly ethnic-based regional states. A second phase was launched 
in 2001 with the District Level Decentralization Program (DLDP), increasing the 
administrative autonomy and capacity of district or woreda administrations.2 
Decentralization entered its third phase with various reforms, political as well as 
administrative, implemented at the kebele or local government level since the mid-2000s. 
For the EPRDF, decentralization is the institutional solution for the country’s 
historic nationality question. The 1994 constitution grants ethno-linguistic groups –
dubbed “nations, nationalities and peoples” in Marxist-Leninist parlance – the right to 
self-determination at local and regional level. Decentralization is also praised as a 
modicum for more effective government service delivery and increased popular 
participation in local government. Post-1991 decentralization in Ethiopia has combined 
elements of deconcentration, i.e. a shift of administrative tasks from the federal and 
regional government to districts and kebeles, as well as the delegation of decision-making 
authority to lower bureaucratic entities, which are not directly controlled by the federal 
government.3 Western donors and multilateral funders have generously supported these 
state reform programs to a remarkable extent, as part of their efforts to foster “good 
governance” and “democratization” in Ethiopia.4 EPRDF’s development policies and 
institutional reforms greatly expanded public service delivery in the last two decades, in 
particular health and education services. Yet Ethiopia’s decentralization record remains 
strongly contested. Critics including opposition parties and human rights organizations as 
well as independent scholars argue that the centralized EPRDF party-state invalidates 
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many of the potential advantages of decentralization.5 While the government vaunts the 
administrative reforms of the past decade as part of a “developmental state” that regularly 
delivers double digit economic growth, critics describe post-2005 decentralization as part 
of an authoritarian conversion by the EPRDF and its affiliated parties. Mass recruitment 
of EPRDF party members from 700 000 in 2005 to 5 million in 2010,6 evidence that 
access to public services and livelihood security is increasingly conditional on party 
membership, the stifling of media and civil society organizations and, most importantly, 
96.6 percent of the seats in the House of People’s Representatives for EPRDF in the May 
2010 federal and regional elections that is a reminder of the one party period of the Derg 
are indicators for this trend.7 
Much has been written about the impacts of decentralization at the regional and 
district levels, yet relatively little research has been done on the dynamics of 
decentralization and administrative reform at the kebele level. As the lowest 
administrative unit the kebele and its organs are the most prominent embodiment of the 
state in rural areas. The kebele is an important service provider and the site of everyday 
encounters between the Ethiopian citizenry and its now “decentralized” government. 
Created by the Derg as peasant associations in 1975 – initially tasked with land-
administration, tax collection and a range of development tasks but later transformed into 
a tool of repression and control8 – kebele became increasingly professionalized and 
differentiated administrative bodies after 1991. Three reforms of the kebele stand out in 
particular in the past decade. First, in a bid to make the kebele more representative, 
legislative councils with up to 300 members tasked with appointing and overseeing the 
kebele executive cabinet were elected for the first time in the April 2008 elections.9 
Second, kebele’s administrative capabilities were enhanced with the appointment of more 
qualified civil servants as well as a kebele manager. Third, a sub-kebele structure that 
effectively fuses party and state personnel and interests was established in many rural 
areas of Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
Region (SNNPR).10 While these reforms are part and parcel of the government’s 
decentralization program, the remaking of the kebele is clearly driven by an expansion of 
bureaucratic structures of control, which are a reminder of the Derg’s project of 
“encadrement”.11 Similarly, as a 2008 comparative study in four regional states 
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demonstrates, service delivery by the kebele remains “largely top-down, supply-led, 
government-organised and standardised”12 in spite of the official rhetoric of participatory 
and accountable local administrations. 
In this article we document recurrent political practices of the decentralized party-
state at the kebele and sub-kebele levels. Based on recent fieldwork in Oromiya by the 
first and second author, we draw attention to the paradoxical effects resulting from the 
expansion of the Ethiopian state’s “infrastructural power”13 that took place in parallel 
with decentralization reforms at the (sub-)kebele level. Our empirical analysis offers a 
more ambiguous picture of post-2005 local government restructuring in Ethiopia and its 
impacts on state-society relations, contradicting the EPRDF story, but also some of the 
overly domination-focused accounts of the Ethiopian state at local level. While our case 
study material supports the observation of a growingly authoritarian Ethiopian state under 
the aegis of the ruling party, it also highlights how the expansion of the party-state in 
rural hinterlands is met with numerous obstacles. Although the new kebele structure 
enhances local officials’ capacity to mobilize and coerce households into state-led 
development projects, we will also show how rural dwellers continue to subvert state 
capture. While the EPRDF as a party has augmented its outreach over voters after the 
incisive 2005 federal and regional elections, party membership more often may reflect an 
economic calculus rather than genuine political conviction. In addition, although the 
“professionalization” and “democratization” of the kebele administration have brought 
local government in close proximity to households, the impunity of corrupt or abusive 
kebele officials in some/many instances reproduces the normative distance that exists 
between state and society. 
Of particular interest is the study of state-society interactions surrounding the 
recent decentralization and reform of local government in Oromiya, Ethiopia’s most 
populous regional entity. Equally important is a first investigation of the heavily 
politicized party-state structure under the kebele level that has been observed in 
Oromiya.14 Although focusing on different localities within Oromiya, the two multi-site 
case studies in this paper provide very similar accounts of the nexus between ruling party, 
state officials and peasantry in the process of local decentralization. They offer 
complementary insights into everyday interactions between (sub-)kebele party-state 
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representatives and local populations on the one hand and intra-institutional dynamics 
within the kebele administration on the other hand. 
Our first case study investigates recent development activities of local 
government in rural Oromiya through the prism of state-led peasant mobilization. 
Focussing on the garee misoma and its role in rural road construction, the first author 
documents state-peasant interactions at kebele, garee and household levels based on three 
months of field research in Meta Robi woreda in mid-2009.15 Meta Robi is located about 
100 km northwest of Addis Ababa in West Shewa zone, connected by daily buses to the 
capital but highly dependent on low profitability subsistence farming. Rural dwellers in 
Meta Robi woreda predominantly identify as ethnic Oromo and adhere to the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christianity. Research concentrated in five of the district’s 42 kebele, located in 
the sloping highlands at an altitude of 2400 to 2900 m. 
Exploring everyday political practices of local administrators in the wake of 
decentralization reforms in Oromiya, the second case study assesses recurring dynamics 
within the newly created kebele councils and between local officials and the wider 
citizenry. It pays particular attention to the nexus between administrators’ party 
membership and their lack of accountability in regard to land allocation and taxation. 
These observations are the condensed result of nine months of field research carried out 
by the second author in 2008 and 2009 in dozens of rural and urban municipalities in 
West Arsi, Southwest Shewa, East Wollega, East Hararghe and Borena zones. Inhabited 
by ethnic Oromo, research localities were purposively sampled to reflect variation in 
terms of religion, access to formal education and infrastructural development. Both 
researchers made use of semi-structured interviews, informal discussions, participatory 
observation and focus group discussions with civil servants, party members, elders, 
farmers, pastoralists and/or merchants in the various localities. 
The following section provides a brief summary of the reformed kebele 
administration and the sub-kebele institutions. Although focusing on Oromiya, this 
overview of the latest phase of local government decentralization applies to other regions 
of Ethiopia as well. The subsequent sections present the two case studies, which illustrate 
some of the above-mentioned dynamics and analyze the impacts of local-level 
decentralization in rural Oromiya. While the first case study highlights interactions 
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between kebele, garee misoma and farmers in state-led rural road construction, the 
second case study sheds light on the dynamics within the kebele administration and on 
state-peasant relations in the context of an administrative reform that perpetuates abusive 
bureaucratic practices to the detriment of representative local government. In the final 
section we discuss the main findings of the two case studies and position them in regard 
to broader debates about the nature of post-1991 decentralization and democratization of 
the Ethiopian state. 
 
 
The politics of local decentralization in Oromiya region 
Ethnic federalism accommodated some of the key demands by Oromo nationalists – 
particularly the use of Afaan Oromoo as a language of instruction in schools – and 
produced an Oromo ethnic elite within the Ethiopian polity.16 Yet competition over who 
politically represented the Oromo continued, if not intensified after 1991.17 The 
administration of the region by the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), a 
constituent party of the ruling EPRDF, is fraught with controversy.18 Since the 1992 
fallout between the EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), OLF sympathizers 
and members of more recent legal opposition parties such as the Oromo People’s 
Congress (OPC19) and the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) portray the 
OPDO as authoritarian, corrupt and a client of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) that dominates the EPRDF. They contend that despite regime change and 
institutional reforms, Oromo continue to be victims of highland – this time Tigrayan 
rather than Amhara – repression and exploitation.20 Contentious relations between OPDO 
officials and broad segments of the Oromo populations nurture recriminations, suspicion 
and regular government repression in local politics.21 Opposition supporters and critics 
are regularly accused of being OLF members, “terrorists” or “anti-peace elements”, an 
allegation that often leads to their imprisonment.22 Student protests in various towns 
across Oromiya in the wake of the 2005 elections have been met with brutal repression 
by the federal police and other security organs.23 As part of a carrot and stick approach, 
the OPDO ranks were swelled after 2005 as employment in the public sector and access 
to state services has become increasingly dependent on party membership.24 
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Decentralization has considerably altered the face of public administration in 
Oromiya in the past decade. After 2002 districts were empowered administratively by 
block grants that are directly transferred from the region, bypassing the zones.25 
Subsequently, woreda were given overall responsibility for providing rural services 
including agricultural extension services to kebele after 2002.26 They thus represent the 
most powerful local government entity as the regional government awards little decision-
making power to the kebele. Yet kebele play an important role in implementing woreda 
plans and policies. They are the “first point of contact” between state and society and are 
tasked with elaborating an annual development plan, collecting land and agricultural 
income tax, mobilizing communities to contribute to government initiated development 
projects, and conflict resolution through the social court.27 Kebele administrations also 
issue identity cards, register, distribute and maintain housing, collect and provide 
documentary evidence related to a host of socio-demographic issues including residence 
or marriage status, communicate with the woreda and initiate a range of developmental 
activities. The kebele consists of three entities; a unicameral legislative council acting as 
the highest representative organ, the executive cabinet whose members are elected 
council members, and the judicative social court composed of three judges.28 The usual 
term of office of all kebele authorities in Oromiya, including the social court, is five years 
in Oromiya.29 
 
The reformed kebele 
In 2008 the number of kebele council members in Oromiya was increased from – 
depending on local demographics – formerly 30 to 50 members to one to three hundred 
members.30 The kebele council is accountable to the district council and the kebele 
electorate by which it is elected.31 The expansion of the kebele councils was part of the 
government’s “good governance package” aiming to enhance “participatory democracy” 
at local level.32 Concomitantly and in a bid to re-assert its grasp over the electorate after 
the challenging 2005 federal and regional elections, the April 2008 elections allowed 
EPRDF to staff the augmented kebele councils with hundreds of thousands of party 
loyalists.33 In Amhara Region, Lefort observed that the vast majority of new kebele 
councilors elected in 2008 were either party members or ‘model farmers’, i.e. peasants 
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whom the government considered as role models in adopting new agricultural extension 
programs.34 
The kebele cabinet is located at the kebele field office where the everyday 
administration of the kebele is run.35 The main task of the kebele cabinet, as defined in 
the 2008 Oromiya constitution, is to plan and implement development activities: its 
members shall “[p]repare development plans and programmers [sic], submit to the 
Kebele Council for approval and implement same”.36 Legally the kebele cabinet consists 
of the kebele administrator, his deputy and other members that “shall be determined by 
law”.37 Most cabinet members receive only a small stipend, but their status and party 
membership qualifies them for other state sponsored handouts.38 According to the 
Oromiya constitution the kebele chairperson is appointed “upon recommendation by a 
political party or a coalition of political parties that constitutes a majority in the 
Council”.39 Before 2008 the kebele cabinet consisted, in most cases, of three council 
members who shouldered the tasks of kebele chairperson (or administrator), his or her 
deputy and the secretary as well as four office heads in charge of administration and 
justice, social court, security (militia), and women affairs.40 These office heads are 
nominated by the kebele chairman, but approved by the council.41 After 2008, these 
cabinet members also oversee the work of the kebele’s civil servants, namely the 
development agent responsible for agricultural extension, the head of school and the head 
of health, which together form the kebele administration.42 Civil servants tend to have 
higher formal education levels than the cabinet members, in the case of Oromiya region 
they have completed at least 10th or 12th grade and hold a certificate.43 
Another recent invention of local government reform in Ethiopia is the position of 
kebele manager. According to Lefort kebele managers were appointed to relieve the 
cabinet from secretarial tasks, to mediate between local officials and the community as 
well as to advise cabinet members.44 Known in Amharic as yesira halafi or “the head in 
charge of work”,45 the kebele manager attends both kebele council and cabinet meetings 
and supervises all development activities by the kebele. Despite his name and function, 
the kebele manager is fully employed by and ultimately answers to the woreda, often 
officiating as a de facto counter-power to the kebele chairman.46 He is widely seen as an 
element of “upward accountability” that characterizes the four-tiered Ethiopian public 
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administration.47 The creation of the kebele manager is evidence of the contradictions 
inherent in the latest round of decentralization in Ethiopia. It reflects both the 
resoluteness with which EPRDF has expanded local government capacities and service 
delivery and the concomitance and continuity of hierarchical intra-government relations 
and practices that undermine the very principle of decentralization. Furthermore, the 
kebele manager marries a neo-liberal understanding of public management with 
bureaucratic and party control by higher echelon district officials. 
 
Sub-kebele institutions 
In addition to augmenting the kebele’s bureaucratic capacities, the regional government 
strengthened the kebele administration through the creation sub-kebele institutions known 
as gott (hamlet) and garee (group or team) in rural areas throughout Oromiya.48 In doing 
so, the kebele was divided territorially into groups of households; while the gott usually 
contains between sixty to ninety households, the garee groups together about twenty to 
thirty households.49 The garee consists of the household heads who live within the garee 
territory.50 Garee members elect representatives who form a five member committee. A 
gott committee of the same size supervises three garee and links them to the kebele, 
establishing a chain of accountability between garee committee, gott committee and 
kebele officials. In 2008 the Oromiya regional government dissolved the gott committees 
and the garee committees were placed under direct supervision of the kebele. Although 
the gott was disbanded institutionally, it continued to exist as a geographical principle of 
organizing the garee. In line with this change the garee committees were restructured and 
reduced to three representatives; the garee chairman, the secretary and the cashier.  
While the gott and garee were recently established in Oromiya, similar 
institutions were introduced before in other regions such as Amhara, Tigray or 
SNNPRS.51 Historically, the garee can be traced back to the mengistawi budin or 
‘government team’, which was created by the Derg and which is mainly documented in 
regard to its purpose in state-led development.52 Based on information obtained in Meta 
Robi woreda, both the garee and the mengistawi budin engaged in development related 
activities but differ in organizational and territorial terms. The mengistawi budin was 
constituted by three leaders; a woman representative, a youth representative and a 
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member of the administration. While the number of mengistawi budin within each 
peasant association (former kebele) is difficult to reconstruct, the present garee and the 
historic mengistawi budin do not overlap geographically in Meta Robi. Despite these 
differences, community members saw the two in historic continuity. Hence an elder 
explained that “[w]hat was once called budin is now called garee” and a young farmer 
even clarified “[a]lthough we say that it is conceptually the same, it is not”.53 
EPRDF presents participation as the means by which the government is brought 
to the people and responds to popular demands.54 In Oromiya the garee figures as the 
most decentralized organization improving administration in rural areas and enabling 
community participation in local development projects.55 Garee members form a fairly 
permanent group – the so-called garee misoma or development team – which provides 
the manual labor necessary for building the infrastructure of various development 
projects related to irrigation, education, health or rural roads. The composition of the 
development team can vary slightly depending on the work at hand: e.g. by excluding 
widows or more elderly persons or by including additional, predominantly young, 
household members. The garee misoma’s activities mainly take place on non-working 
days such as weekends or religious holidays and they account for one to three days per 
month. 
However, there are also more critical interpretations regarding the ultimate raison 
d’être of the gott and garee. While the sub-kebele structure “acts as a channel of 
communication and mobilization for a given number of households” as Dessalegn 
Rahmato remarked, the sub-kebele structure has also been criticized as a highly 
politicized government “tool of control as well as development”.56 A series of reports 
issued by Human Rights Watch describe the gott and garee in Oromiya as effective 
mechanisms for suppressing political dissent against the ruling and omnipresent OPDO.57 
Contradicting the supposedly voluntary character of participation in the sub-kebele 
development teams, observers have drawn attention to the overlap between gott and 
garee on the one hand and a decentralized party cell structure on the other hand.58 Hence 
Bevan concludes that the penetration of households by state-party officials serves 
primarily a propagandistic purpose, aiming to convince farmers of the benefits of joining 
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government sponsored rural development programs and, ultimately, voting for the 
EPRDF.59 
 
 
The garee misoma as a bridge between peasantry and the state 
Rural road construction in Meta Robi reflects the importance of the sub-kebele, but is 
also in continuation with a long history of top-down policies and interventions by the 
Ethiopian state at local level. The Derg ordered peasants to organize in so-called 
mengistawi budin and to take part in development activities as rural road construction 
works within the kebele, formerly known as peasant association. With the arrival of the 
EPRDF, kebele militia began to shoulder the responsibility of mobilizing the peasantry 
for development projects. As one farmer remembered: “The people themselves 
maintained the road and were organized by the kebele chairman. The kebele chairman 
ordered the people by the militia who have guns. The militia was given an assignment 
and it was done accordingly”.60 After 2003, the garee inherited the task of peasant 
mobilization in Meta Robi from its predecessors.61 
 
Peasant mobilization 
The garee is instrumental in road construction in rural parts of Oromiya region. Its 
functioning must be understood in a broader set of hierarchical development encounters 
between local government officials and populations. At the district level, the Woreda 
Rural Road Office (WRRO) is tasked with the administration, construction and 
maintenance of rural roads.62 While the WRRO plans the district’s rural road network, its 
role in construction is reduced to sporadic coordination and supervision as it tasks the 
kebele administration with the actual construction works. Kebele officials then mobilize 
the peasantry in several steps: First, kebele officials and garee leaders hold meetings to 
gather the inhabitants of the locality and inform them about the impending works. 
Second, the kebele administration divides the planned road geographically and assigns 
each garee to a particular section. Third, the kebele instructs garee leaders to convene 
their members at a specific time and place. Fourth, the garee leader orders his garee 
members – organized in a team of about twenty to thirty laborers – to build the road. 
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Garee leaders also participate in and coordinate the manual works that consists in 
clearing the surface and digging the floor’s unevenness. Furthermore, they oversee garee 
members’ presence at the worksite and regularly report to the kebele administration.  
Kebele officials deploy a variety of discourses and strategies to rally the peasantry 
for government-led development projects. Their rhetoric emphasizes the major role and 
importance of rural roads for development in terms of health, communication, education, 
transport, agriculture or market access. This development rhetoric is articulated regularly 
during kebele as well as garee meetings and appropriates a great deal of national 
development policy discourse, which is transplanted to the local arena.63 In conversations 
with kebele and garee officials, they argued that the expected benefits of new rural roads 
convinced local people to participate in their construction. Contrary to local officials’ 
perception, interviews with garee members and ordinary peasants revealed that 
participants in rural road construction projects did so primarily because they were ordered 
to, not because they saw it as a beneficial development effort in their interest. For 
example, a farmer complained that “[w]e don’t say anything, they just order us (…) 
participation does not change anything”.64 
When it comes to government-led development initiatives, rural dwellers in Meta 
Robi perceive little difference between participation and mobilization and some even 
used these terms interchangeably in interviews. In reality, garee leaders mobilize farmers 
and instruct them to partake in construction efforts as manual laborers. The garee leader 
justifies his actions by reference to the written letter received from the kebele and hence 
as the consequence of an order received from above. Furthermore, armed militia 
accompany the garee leader and enforce his authority in case people refuse to participate 
in rural road construction.65 Several participants referred to the coercive role of the kebele 
militia and particularly their gun, which represents a powerful tool in mobilizing the 
peasantry. Peasants who refuse to take part in rural road construction are fined both at 
garee and kebele level. Informants further reported that a refusal to participate in rural 
construction can also result in losing access to those resources distributed by the state 
such as fertilizer or land, as well as range of legal and administrative sanctions by the 
kebele administration. Individuals who refuse to follow these orders are often accused of 
being OLF members or sympathizers and of acting against the government.66 This 
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accusation carries potentially devastating consequences. It not only threatens ordinary 
farmers but also garee leaders who resist the kebele’s orders. 
It is this combination of local government’s authoritarian traits and its control 
over rural means of production,67 which compels peasants to comply with the kebele’s 
demand for unpaid labor. However, from the viewpoint of some of those who participate 
in rural road construction, this very act offers an opportunity to ensure access to state 
controlled resources such as agricultural inputs or land. In Meta Robi, a farmer’s ability 
to maintain his livelihood crucially depends on maintaining good relations with local 
government. In his analysis, Pausewang argues that “[a]ccess to land is a question of life 
and death for an Ethiopian peasant”.68 As a young farmer in Meta Robi stated: “[w]e 
hope that the government helps us if we participate (…) in garee activities (…). But so 
far, we did not win the lottery”.69 Vice versa, farmers’ compliance with demands to 
provide unpaid labour to rural road construction reproduces state authority at local level 
as evidenced in the following statement by a garee leader: “Most people participate 
because we ordered them. We did not force people but they agreed themselves”.70 Rather 
than a forum where people can voice their demands, the garee is utilized by kebele 
administrators as an instrument to mobilize the peasantry. In Meta Robi the garee did not 
initiate development activities on its own. As a garee leader clarified: “We just order 
people to attend meetings when we are ordered from above”.71 In popular perception, 
garee gatherings or activities never occurred on an independent or autonomous basis, but 
were always the result of a prior order from above. 
 
The government’s long arm 
The creation of the garee has significantly enhanced government control at household 
level and reflects an expansion of state power far beyond its claimed development realm. 
Several informants emphasized garee leaders’ proximity to the community as an 
advantage for them in reaching out to those expected to enroll in state-led development 
projects. As a woreda official pointed out: “The main reason for the establishment [of the 
garee] is more control over the people to participate”.72 This squares with Dessalegn 
Rahmato’s conclusion that “[t]he new government has thus extended the power and 
influence of the state even further than the Derg”.73 This claim is also echoed by 
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Pankhurst who argues that “[d]espite decentralization (…) state penetration has reached 
deeper than ever before into rural society”.74 
When compared to the prior period when militia shouldered the task of peasant 
mobilization, the garee has significantly augmented the kebele administration’s capacity 
to mobilize the peasantry as well as to implement development policy. This said, the 
importance of the garee in rallying peasants for construction works was relatively short-
lived and decreased after 2005. During field research in mid-2009, kebele officials 
insisted that the garee worked efficiently in a variety of development related activities, 
but this view was often contradicted in private conversations. Vaughan and Tronvoll’s 
observed that “local administrators control the public political arena at the local village 
level, and (…) their authority is seldom publicly questioned by the people”.75 This also 
holds true for Meta Robi where some informants argued in private that the garee is weak. 
This viewpoint is nicely captured in the following explanation by one of the garee 
leaders: 
 
(…) once we constructed a school, road, health clinic, but the garee leaders are currently sitting at 
home and the garee leader is in his house. At the same time, people are farming and treating their 
crops, but they may participate in kebele activities if they are ordered. (…) Look, the garee is 
existing in name, but is not functional. In the past there were meetings held at the garee level, but 
today there are just meetings at the kebele. (…) The garee as such has no initiative to hold 
meetings and the garee gets weaker and weaker.76 
 
While this account emphasizes the garee’s inactivity, it also reveals that the garee 
remains institutionalized and its leaders are kept in place. 
Besides mobilizing peasants for development projects, the garee is at the center of 
local government’s political control and surveillance of households and an important 
channel for government information and propaganda. Several informants reported that 
the garee was used by the ruling OPDO to mobilize voters and advocate for their policies 
in the run-up to the contested 2005 federal and regional elections. More importantly, as a 
kebele manager stated, the garee “keeps security and counteracts aggression, which is 
directed against the government”.77 He further argued that the garee collects information 
about those who act against the regime and that it advises people not to follow the 
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“enemy”. Since the garee leader lives among the people, “the garee knows everything, 
also the secrets of the people”.78 Vaughan and Tronvoll report very similar practices by 
peasant associations during the Derg regime: “[L]ocal administrators worked as 
informers and spies, keeping the grassroots under surveillance and reporting any ‘anti-
revolutionary’ and ’anti-government’ activities back to the party and intelligence 
services”.79 
In Meta Robi, the boundaries between the state and the ruling party are blurred 
both in their officials’ daily practices and in ordinary people’s perception. This is 
apparent not only in the way the ruling party instrumentalizes the garee, but also in the 
way state and party structures overlap at household level. In the district’s countryside, the 
OPDO’s outreach has expanded significantly since early 2009 through the creation and 
multiplication of local party cells, locally called celli. Their establishment aimed at 
consolidating the ruling party at the household level by promoting the government’s 
development efforts and achievements among the populace. A cell leader described the 
cell’s activities as follows: “We study newspapers every two weeks (…) to produce 
members for the party, the OPDO, that’s the main objective”.80 Following the 
establishment of the cell, several former gott and garee leaders became cell leaders in 
their respective locality. The overlap between state (garee) and party (OPDO cell) leaders 
makes it difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish between the ruling party and the 
state. Rural dwellers hardly perceive a difference between the local state structure and the 
party structure. Some interlocutors argued that the cell is just another name for the 
garee.81 A cell leader emphasized that “both are the same and both work for the 
government (…) all people are members of the OPDO and other statements are 
propaganda”.82 Others assumed that the cell has substituted the gott, executes the kebele’s 
orders and therefore commands authority over the garee.83 
 
Avoiding the garee 
Except for the garee and cell leaders, Meta Robi’s inhabitants do not identify with the 
garee but rather perceive it as part of the government. Thus, a distance between peasantry 
and local party-state persists, limiting the ability of a decentralized government to fully 
encapsulate households and opening up a space in which the latter can be challenged. In 
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private conversations few ordinary people support the government and its development 
initiatives. As a farmer complained: “I don’t understand the purpose of the government 
because there is no development and change at all. Although there are so many 
obligations and they strive for bringing their own power structure but I see no 
development”.84 An elder lamented: “They have done nothing and the garee is for 
nothing. They put the name garee, they call for meetings, they hold a speech, but they do 
nothing”.85 Intrusive interventions by the government and its manipulation of the garee 
reproduce and at times even widen the gap between peasantry and the state. As a result 
garee leaders’ social standing in the community is constrained as they derive their 
authority from their privileged relation with the kebele administrator and the militia. 
Several garee leaders expressed the difficulty they faced when attempting to convince 
households to follow kebele directives. As one garee leader complained: “If we try to 
widen up the road, the people do not participate and even elect us away (…) we don’t 
have power”.86 
Moreover, the abatement of garee-led rural road construction activities after 2005 
gave peasants some elbow room to resist government mobilization.87 Rural dwellers 
interpreted the garee’s inactivity in different terms. While some agreed that there is no 
choice in obeying the government’s order, others questioned the garee’s authority. As a 
young farmer stated: “So far, I have not observed garee activities because the people do 
not accept the garee’s order”.88 During field research in mid-2009, also refusing to take 
part in kebele meetings was a recurrent and accepted practice among local farmers in 
Meta Robi. However, it was mainly understood that the kebele “would be” strong enough 
to achieve people’s participation for activities of the kebele. In his analysis of state-
peasant relations in Ethiopia, Aspen argues that as a result of the deep imbalance of 
power the peasants’ most rational strategy is “to minimise the contact with the state by 
obeying only the inescapable demands it imposes on the peasantry, and otherwise to 
ignore it”.89 Despite the recent decentralization of the party-state to the household level in 
rural Oromiya, peasants continue to honor the maxim of avoiding the state whenever 
possible, and obeying the required works whenever necessary. 
The establishment of the garee also sparked criticism by some garee leaders. In 
many ways the appointment of numerous garee leaders at household level increases local 
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government’s presence in ordinary people’s lives. Indeed, there are garee leaders who 
genuinely support the government as the following example shows: 
 
For me this government is great and I have never seen such a government in my life. They show 
us that they are strong and we believe in it. The government advises us and because of these 
advices people are capable to manage their life, to work properly, especially on their farm, and to 
cooperate with each other.90 
 
However, in conversations various garee leaders question for example the 
instrumentalization of the garee by the OPDO during the 2005 elections, the authoritarian 
interventions by kebele and woreda officials or the government’s approach to rural 
development. At least in private, these leaders challenge state authority, yet most of them 
maintain their position as garee leaders within the established structure. 
 
 
Kebele reform and the (un-)making of representative local government 
The benefit of occupying a position in one of the kebele organs is evident in the case of 
the executive cabinet. The kebele’s control over land, agricultural inputs and public 
services is important to understand local officials’ desire to achieve or maintain access to 
these state controlled resources. Within the decentralized local government bureaucrats, 
civil servants and party members compete for positions and influence at kebele level.91 
Tensions that are inherent to a decentralization process driven by a dominant party-state 
come to the forefront as local officials legitimize their actions both in terms of their 
position within the party and in terms of their bureaucratic expertise. Political loyalty to 
the ruling OPDO on the one hand, and education that qualifies for civil service on the 
other hand thus accompany kebele reform, co-existing as conflicting repertoires 
mobilized by local officials.92 
 
Mobilizing the party shield 
The predominant role of the OPDO in Oromiya’s political life has a strong bearing on the 
kebele councils. Although some of the opposition parties are legally registered, no of 
them can compete with the ruling OPDO for seats in the kebele as well as district 
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councils. As a result, all members of the kebele councils are either members of or at least 
supporters of the ruling party what reflects the little space for opposition parties to 
participate in the region’s governance. Given this unanimity of political opinion within 
the councils, their legislative function is limited. In practice it is rather the kebele cabinet 
that holds the real power within the kebele, often by dictating or manipulating the 
council. Kebele cabinet members rather than councilors influence the daily lives of urban 
and rural dwellers, which explains why the first are much better known in the community 
than the second. 
Although the Oromiya government has made efforts to improve the planning and 
implementation capacity of kebele administrations by recruiting more educated civil 
servants, these measures have not yet achieved their objective. One of the reasons for this 
failure is the difficult cooperation between kebele cabinet members. In contrast to the 
other cabinet member appointed from the kebele council, civil servants became 
nominated upon recommendation of the local OPDO branch because they were assumed 
to be “more educated” and resistant to the way the incumbent government administers the 
people. In contrast, kebele administrators often suspect these professionals to be resistant 
and are therefore at unease collaborating with them. A recurrent pattern reported in West 
Arsi zone in beginning of 2008 is the following; when the educated cabinet members 
want to suggest measures by which local people participate in development activities, the 
other four cabinet members – in this case the chairperson, deputy, secretary and head of 
women affairs – are often reluctant, partly because they consider themselves as politically 
more important.93 In case the more educated cabinet members attempt to defy the 
maladministration of the four cadres, they can be transferred to another locality, which 
might be distant from infrastructural facilities including health centers, markets and 
roads. The denoted reason for this is that the kebele administrator – often without 
consulting with the rest of the council members – reports to the district administration 
that his colleagues are resisting government directives, which can lead to their dismissal 
or transfer. As this report indicates, the later are expected to be submissive to the “less 
educated” administrators and members of the ruling party more generally. Likewise, 
people are also expected to submit to the administrators regardless of what they have 
done as part of their official duties. 
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To be considered for appointment as a member of the kebele administration, one 
has to join the ruling OPDO party. It is essentially this party membership, which licenses 
kebele officials to use public office for their personal advantage. This phenomenon has 
maybe dampened popular acceptance of the OPDO in Oromiya most, although Oromo 
now have the right to use their own language in regional administration and as medium of 
instruction in schools and regional colleges. Informants in different parts of the region 
pointed out a spreading of corruption by local officials, a practice that seems to have 
percolated with decentralization from regional to kebele level. In informal discussions 
interlocutors would make this point by saying that “These days, bribe taking has come 
and [sic] knocking at our door and windows. Before this government, it was far from us 
and we knew it more at district and above levels”.94 
Kebele administrators make strategic use of their party membership to shield 
themselves from criticism of their conduct by the public. Their reluctance to cooperate 
with more educated civil servants within the cabinet, their tendency to distance 
themselves from the population rather than engaging with them, and their use of public 
office for personal advantages are rendered possible by their party affiliation. As they are 
ultimately accountable to the OPDO, kebele administrators are protected from criticism 
and disapproval by non-party members until the party decides to remove them. However, 
the great challenge of local politics in Oromiya is that there is no criterion for knowing 
who supports the opposition. Consequently, deterrence of opposition supporters is largely 
only based on suspicion, which in turn allows certain administrators to stay in power by 
frightening individuals with allegations of subversive intent.95 To this effect, becoming 
an OPDO party member is advantageous as it allows deterring others from making 
unfounded accusations.96 Many educated civil servants within kebele cabinets have 
joined the party for this reason, although their original mandate was less political, namely 
to assist the local cabinet executive. 
 
Abuses by kebele administrators 
Kebele administrators are aware that they will eventually be removed from their post and 
they therefore attempt to make use of the opportunities that present themselves while 
being in office. Publicly officials underline that they exercise and embody the rule of law, 
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daunting those who resist or question their actions. Anybody who attempts to challenge 
malpractices by the kebele administration risks being accused as an OLF supporter. Since 
the four core members of the kebele cabinet usually are familiar with one another, either 
as party and work colleagues or because of close kinship ties, they are often at the center 
of a clientelistic network that includes selected farmers and elders in the community and 
party officials at district level. In many cases these networks serve the purpose of 
soliciting bribes in exchange for administrative favors. For instance, kebele 
administrators might expect a bribe for giving an individual an urban land plot, (re-
)allocating farming or grazing land, or settling other administrative issues. Those who 
have money and ties with kebele officials are thus in a privileged position to obtain 
services or have their case decided in their favor. 
 As informants in Southwest Shewa, North Shewa and West Arsi zones reported, 
bribing kebele officials is common and it excludes certain segments of the community – 
those with less financial means – from access to public services including urban and rural 
land. Bribes are usually paid in cash and at times are accompanied by an invitation for 
beer. In some parts of Oromiya this practice has motivated merchants to bring beer from 
urban areas and sell them in rural villages. Peasants typically invite kebele executive 
members of their locality for beers, but enjoy themselves with areqee (local drink) while 
officials discuss and decide on the matter of the petitioner.97 Hotels and beer houses are 
thus important sites where kebele members settle individual cases presented to them. In 
this sense kebele offices exist primarily to provide an aura of legality to decisions made 
in beer houses. In some localities kebele officials are regularly found in places where beer 
is served and it is easier to encounter them in the beer house than their workplace. 
Administrators also use their power to (re-)allocate urban and rural land within 
the kebele to solicit bribes. Land use disagreements are settled by the kebele and 
claimants know that they need to pay something. If one of the parties appeals to the 
district administration, the latter may refer the case back to the kebele administration. 
This is a common practice in Oromiya, giving kebele officials considerable sway in 
determining who has access to farmland. Local inhabitants thus depend on the goodwill 
of kebele administrators as they have little alternative legal recourses available. Another 
major opportunity for corruption are kebele court decisions pertaining to contested land 
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allocation. As evidenced by the following statement by Tadele Nagisho, president of the 
Oromiya Regional State Supreme Court, the region’s authorities recognizes the problem 
posed by the multiplication of land disputes, which end up in courtroom: 
 
Claims and counter-claims pertaining to farming land represent the most common cases of which 
individuals often accuse each other in Oromiya region. They account for about seventy to eighty 
percent of all cases that are presented to court. (…) For instance, within six months, that is, in 
2009, three thousand land-based cases were presented to court. (…) In this process, families and 
friends of claimants and counter claimants accompany and also ’attend’ the court. This is greatly 
damaging their livelihood because they are spending more time in attending cases. In addition, 
farmers, merchants, and government employees are all upset and thought about court process in 
the region.98 
 
As under previous regimes land taxation rates are decided by higher authorities and then 
forwarded to kebele administrators. As local inhabitant have little information about tax 
issues, kebele officials at times may use this gap to their benefit by demanding arbitrary 
tax amounts from different households. They may thus order some households on whom 
they want to revenge to pay more tax than the legal requirement, splitting the difference 
among themselves. In other cases certain households are asked to pay taxes twice a year 
instead of once. In all these cases abusive kebele officials draw on their privileged 
relations with district officials. Such abuses as reported by informants in West Arsi zone 
undermine local level-decentralization. Both the federal and the Oromiya governments 
have admitted that the delegation of power to districts has been faced with challenges 
such as a “lack of well established local governance system accountable to local people 
and responsible to service delivery” and “lack of commitment and attention by sector 
bureaus”.99 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have analyzed recurrent administrative practices and intra-institutional 
patterns by kebele and sub-kebele officials as part of the latest round of decentralization 
in Oromiya. Highlighting everyday interactions among local officials and between the 
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party-state and the broader populace, our empirical material reveals a reproduction of 
hierarchical state-society relations that co-exist with (and at times are reinforced by) 
decentralization and local government reform. Rather than enhancing community 
participation in local state affairs or making the kebele more accountable, state-society 
interactions at kebele and sub-kebele level in Oromiya continue to be informed by a 
deeply rooted tradition of hierarchy. In this authoritarian tradition of mengist 
(government) local administrators dispose of discretionary powers in commanding and 
controlling peasant labour and other contributions to the state, most importantly political 
loyalty. Peasant mobilization for state-led development activities at sub-kebele level is 
informed by a logic according to which the party-state issues orders and people obey.100 
A similar imposition of hierarchical relations is observable within kebele cabinets where 
“more educated” civil servants are expected to submit to less professionally qualified, but 
more politically connected cabinet members. The investigation of kebele administration 
practices in Oromiya demonstrates how local bureaucrats make strategic use of their 
position in the party-state to obtain personal benefits and maintain power in the local 
political arena. Similar strategies are observable at garee level, as popular participation is 
not only the result of state coercion, but is also a strategy to access state controlled 
services. 
Decentralization in Oromiya has empowered kebele administrations and 
facilitated the expansion of state authority to rural hinterlands. Particularly the garee is 
instrumentalized by the kebele, operating as the long arm of the government, which 
mobilizes, surveys and controls households far beyond its proclaimed developmental 
goals. Yet the power of the local party-state is neither absolute nor unlimited as peasants 
and even garee leaders also resist or subvert state-led development works and kebele 
officials must rely on clientelistic networks to implement policies. In this sense the 
convoluted nexus between mass party, state and people that characterizes the everyday 
politics of EPRDF’s “revolutionary democracy” is both a source of strength and 
weakness. Although local government expands to households in the guise of 
“decentralization” and the name of “development”, this process – which critics describe 
as an intrusion by an authoritarian government – also provides some room for maneuver 
for those who seek to utilize the party-state for their own ends. Hence, accounts of 
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absolute and unchecked bureaucratic domination by the OPDO in Oromiya as suggested 
by some Oromo nationalists and human rights organizations deserve more nuance.101 
This said, the lack of genuine representative democracy within the restructured 
kebele is evident. Although citizens have the right to elect representatives to the kebele 
council every five years, kebele cabinet members who play a much more important role 
in people’s everyday lives, eschew popular election. In Oromiya region the 
administrators are selected from and appointed by the kebele council upon 
recommendation of the ruling party.102 As a result, administrators are more accountable 
to the kebele council and the district administration than to the electorate. Similarly, at 
sub-kebele level garee members elect garee leaders as their “representatives”, but they 
hardly feel represented by the garee. Contrary to official claims the garee is widely 
perceived as part of the state structure and not as a platform where people can express 
their demands. So far, local government decentralization in Oromiya has failed to 
produce increased political participation and administrative accountability. The 
conflation of party and state officials and agendas, the top-down imposition of rural 
development initiatives and the expansion of party-state control over rural masses counter 
the promises of “good governance” associated with a decentralized administration.103  
Post-1991 decentralization in Oromiya, which seeks to “promote and support the 
people’s self-rule at all levels”,104 remains – depending on one’s viewpoint – either an 
unfulfilled promise or work in progress. As optimistic decentralization proposals become 
embedded in local arenas and existing power relations, self-preservation by the party and 
individual officials trump efforts to break with the authoritarian legacies of the Ethiopian 
state. While the reformed kebele and the creation of the garee have decentralized the state 
to the household level, they did not bring the OPDO-run government closer to the people. 
As one of the author’s informants observed pessimistically: “Government policies seem 
[like a] mountain at region, but shrink to the size of [a] camel, [a] leaf, and finally turn to 
ash at zone, district, and kebele [level] respectively”.105 
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Notes 
                                                
1 Also called killil, zone, woreda and kebele in Amharic respectively. 
2 Dessalegn Rahmato, Peasant and the State, 244; Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher and Kassahun 
Berhanu, “Literature Review,” 10. 
3 Rondinelli, “Government Decentralization”. According to Rondinelli’s classic distinction 
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